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Conduct from the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, is 
opposing counsel obligated to pay the plaintiffs' suit costs? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Second 
District Court in Davis County, Farmington, Utah, Judge Douglas 
L. Cornaby, presiding. This case involves a property boundary 
dispute. Judge Cornaby granted the disputed property to the 
defendant under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied. 
2. Statement of the Facts. 
(1) Plaintiffs ask for quiet title to a 12* x 120' strip of 
property included in their 1969 warranty deed and their 1969 
survey. This property is currently being used by the defendant, 
who claims she owns this property via the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
(2) Exhibit A is a summary of exhibits in the pleadings. 
Exhibit A shows the date relationships between the fence the 
defendant claims is the boundary and the surveys of the deed 
boundaries. Also, it summarizes the warranty deed history on 
each piece of property, (surveys, R. 185, 194; warranty deeds on 
plaintiffs' property, R. 485, 77-80; warranty deeds on 
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defendant's property, R. 85-93) Plaintiffs have highlighted the 
disputed property on the surveys. 
(3) The District Court found the fence the defendant claims 
s the boundary was installed in 1953; but competent evidence 
shows the fence was not installed until at least 1956, thirteen 
years before the plaintiffs purchased their property and received 
their survey. (Fact 5. R. 722-723) 
(4) The District Court found the fence was installed 
pursuant to a 1953 survey, but the survey was never produced as 
evidence and plaintiffs dispute the existence of such survey. 
(Fact 5, R. 723-727) 
(5) In 1978 the defendant purchased property adjoining the 
plaintiffs' lot. When the defendant purchased her property, she 
received a survey from her grantor that shows the fence is about 
12 feet south of her south boundary. The defendant's 1978 survey 
agrees with the plaintiffs' 1969 survey as to the location of the 
common deed boundary with reference to the fence, (surveys, R. 
185, 194) 
(6) The disputed property has not been conveyed to the 
defendant or to any of her predecessors in title. Therefore, the 
property taxes have not been assessed to or paid by the defendant 
or any of her predecessors in title. (Fact 12, R. 49, 312) 
(7) The disputed property has been conveyed by warranty 
deed to the plaintiffs and to all of their predecessors in 
interest. Therefore, the property taxes have been assessed to 
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and paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest. 
(Fact 11. R. 49, 312) 
(8) All of the warranty deeds on the defendant's property 
describe the south boundary as being 100 feet south of the front 
of her lot. None reference the fence as the boundary, (warranty 
deeds on defendant's property, R. 85-93) 
(9) There is no overlap in the metes and bounds 
descriptions of the defendant's and the plaintiffs' properties. 
(Fact 9, R. 49, 312) 
(10) There are no structures on the disputed property, nor 
are there any structures on the defendant's property that need 
the disputed property to meet city zoning requirements. (Facts 
28 and 29. R. 55, 313-314) 
(11) Plaintiffs sent a letter dated October 10, 1989, 
telling the defendant the plaintiffs intended to install a fence 
along the common deed boundary, (letter, R. 113) On September 
27, 1990, plaintiffs filed suit to quiet title to the disputed 
property. (Fact 24, R. 613) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the current case prima facie evidence shows there 
was not mutual acquiescence in the fence as the common deed 
boundary for the required period of time. Given this fact, 
plaintiffs cite a case in point and other authority to show the 
District Court's judgment of boundary by acquiescence should be 
overturned. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT 
THE DISPUTED PROPERTY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE THERE IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THERE WAS NOT 
MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS THE DEED BOUNDARY FOR THE 
REQUIRED PERIOD OF TIME. 
The plaintiffs' 1969 survey put them on notice the 
fence is not on the deed boundary from the time they purchased 
their property, 13 years after the fence was installed. At the 
time the defendant purchased her property in 1978, she received a 
survey that shows the fence is not on the deed boundary. The 
Court has ruled that such knowledge precludes mutual acquiescence 
in an artificial boundary. In Wood v. Myrup. 681 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1984), a case in point, plaintiffs Critchley believed the fence 
was on the boundary until plaintiffs Critchley had a survey made 
in 1959, eleven years after they purchased their property. 
Plaintiffs Critchley did not inform defendants Myrup of 
Critchley's survey nor did plaintiffs Wood and Critchley use 
their properties on the other side of the fence; there was no 
dispute until plaintiffs Wood and Critchley filed suit for quiet 
title and trespassing in September 1980, twenty-one years after 
the Critchleys' 1959 survey. In overturning the lower courts 
ruling of boundary by acquiescence, the Supreme Court ruled: 
Contrary to the rule originally administered by the 
courts of equity, our statutory action to quiet title 
does not require that a plaintiff allege and prove his 
possession of the disputed property. Id. at 1257. 
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... while there was "acquiescence in the [fence] line 
as the boundary," id., for 11 years, that acquiescence 
cannot be inferred beyond 1959, when plaintiffs 
Critchley received a survey and knew that their legal 
line was some feet south of the fence. The requirement 
of acquiescence "for a long period of years," id., is 
not satisfied by 11 years. As we have noted, "[Olnly 
under unusual circumstances would a lesser period [than 
20 years] be deemed sufficient." Id. at 1258 
In Wright v. Clissold. 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974), the 
Court established that mutual belief that a fence is on the deed 
boundary is a requirement for mutual acquiescence in a fence as 
the boundary. The Court discounted the need for affirmative 
action to negate mutual acquiescence. In its decision the Court 
In the instant case, defendants [acquiescence 
claimants] urge that the failure of plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in interest to take affirmative 
action concerning the property north of the fence 
constitutes mutual acquiescence in the fence as the 
boundary, regardless of any actual knowledge by the 
parties that the fence was not the boundary. Id. at 
1226-1227 
In refuting this contention, the Court cites Fuoco v. Williams: 
In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence; it is 
not necessary that the acquiescence should be 
manifested by a conventional agreement, but recognition 
and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must 
have knowledge of the existence of a line as boundary 
line. Wright v. Clissold 521 P.2d at 1227 (Utah 1974) 
and cited from Fuoco v. Williams 18 Utah 2d at 286, 421 
P.2d at 947 (1966) 
In the current case plaintiffs have known the fence is not on the 
deed boundary from the time they purchased their property in 1969 
and received their survey, thirteen (13) years after the fence 
was installed. 
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In the current case the metes and bounds descriptions 
in both parties' warranty deeds provide adequate information to 
allow both owners to locate the common deed boundary on the 
ground. The boundary in question is described as being 100 feet 
from the front of the defendant's lot--a flat, open area. This 
description is given in all of the warranty deeds on both pieces 
of property; none of the warranty deeds reference the fence as 
the boundary. In addition to this information being in the 
warranty deeds, the defendant's father and previous occupant of 
her property, testified repeatedly that he knew he purchased only 
100 feet of north-south dimension. (Tingey deposition, R. 124, 
125, 135) The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that this kind of 
knowledge prevents mutual acquiescence in an artificial boundary. 
In Low v. Bonacci. 788 P.2d 512 (Utah 1990), a case that followed 
Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) the Court denied 
boundary by acquiescence. In listing factors that showed mutual 
acquiescence was lacking the Court said: 
Bonacci [the acquiescence claimant] was placed on 
notice of the existing boundary by the prior 
condemnation action, as well as by the metes and bounds 
property description contained in the warranty deed 
from his predecessor in interest which was recorded at 
Bonacci's request, [emphasis added] Id. at 513. 
In the current case the defendant received both a warranty deed 
and a survey from her predecessor in interest to put her on 
notice of the deed boundary with reference to the fence. 
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II. THE DEFENDANT CANNOT USE HER PREDECESSORS' PERIODS 
OF OWNERSHIP AND OCCUPANCY TO SATISFY THE REQUIRED PERIOD OF 
MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE HER PREDECESSORS DID NOT CONVEY THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY TO THEIR GRANTEES EVEN THOUGH THE DEFENDANT'S 
IMMEDIATE PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST HAD A SURVEY THAT SHOWED HE HAD 
BEEN USING THE DISPUTED PROPERTY. 
When the defendant purchased her property in 1978, the 
defendant's predecessor in interest ordered, received, and gave 
to the defendant a survey that shows her predecessor had been 
using the disputed property. (Fact 19, R. 613) In fact the 
survey shows that her predecessor in interest knew he was using 
property in excess of his legal description before he ordered 
this survey because he had to specifically request the second 
description on the survey, "Description of Property to the Use 
Lines." (survey, R. 194) Having this information, the 
defendant's predecessor in interest did not convey the disputed 
property to the defendant. In other words, this is prima facie 
evidence he did not regard the fence line as the boundary, but 
instead relied on the metes and bounds description in his legal 
description. 
In Brown v. Peterson Development Co.. 622 P.2d 1175 
(Utah 1980), the acquiescence claimants had notice of the true 
lot boundaries before buying and closing their lot purchases. If 
they had not obtained quitclaim deeds for the disputed property 
adjacent to the property in their legal descriptions, their claim 
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to the disputed property would not have been upheld. The Court 
ruled: 
The fact that the plaintiff lot buyers had notice of 
the actual lot boundaries before buying and closing 
their lot purchases would have been fatal to their 
action if they had not received a conveyance of the 
legal title to the disputed strip of land by means of 
quitclaim deeds from the former owners of it. The 
later quitclaim deeds passed the legal title to them. 
Id. at 1178. 
In the current case the defendant received a survey to put her on 
notice of her actual lot boundaries. She did not obtain a 
conveyance of the disputed property. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT WAS 
INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS WERE DISPUTED 
WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE OR WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY REQUIRED 
EVIDENCE. ALSO, THE CONCLUSION OF LAW IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
UNDISPUTED FINDING. 
The undisputed finding that is inconsistent with the 
conclusion of law is that the plaintiffs have a 1969 survey that 
agrees with the defendant's 1978 survey in showing the fence is 
about twelve feet from the common deed boundary. Knowledge the 
fence is not on the deed boundary prevents acquiescence in the 
fence as the boundary. 
The remaining findings were disputed with conflicting 
testimony as well as with documents and with presumptive 
evidence. See Exhibit B, "Ruling on the Motions for Summary 
Judgment," which contains the lower court's findings and 
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conclusions. See Exhibit C. "Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Findings 9-25-91", to which references to the record have been 
added to substantiate the conflicting evidence. These references 
to the record do not appear in the copy that was filed in the 
District Court and attached to the Docketing Statement. Summary 
judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine issue as to a 
material fact. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. Procedures 56(c). 
The alleged "1953 survey" of Milton C. Green's is not 
admissable evidence because it has never been produced even 
though the plaintiffs made a formal request for its production. 
"Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith." Utah R. Civ. Procedures 56(e). However, even if the 
defendant can produce this "survey", Green's testimony in his 
deposition for the defense indicates this "survey" would not 
support mutual acquiescence in the fence as the boundary. Milton 
C. Green testified that this alleged "survey" shows the fence is 
not on the "survey" line. (Green's deposition, R. 773-775) 
IV. OPPOSING COUNSEL AND/OR THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
MADE TO PAY THE PLAINTIFFS' COSTS OF THIS SUIT. OPPOSING COUNSEL 
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HAS INFLATED THE COST OF THIS SUIT BY VIOLATING RULE 3.3(a)(1) OF 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FROM THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION. CHAPTER 13. THE DEFENDANT HAS POSSESSED A SURVEY 
THAT SHOWS THE FENCE IS NOT ON THE COMMON DEED BOUNDARY SINCE 
1978. BUT SHE HAS TAKEN NO ACTION TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY OR TO RELINQUISH CONTROL 
OVER IT. 
The defendant's pleadings are replete with examples of 
opposing counsel's violation of Professional Rule of Conduct 
3.3(a)(1). These violations are noted throughout the plaintiffs' 
pleadings. "A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement 
of material fact or law to a tribunal." Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Chapter 13, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
3.3(a)(1). 
The defendant claims she owns the plaintiffs' property, 
but she has consistently refused to take action to assume the 
responsibilities of ownership. The defendant failed to file suit 
for boundary by acquiescence or to settle the boundary 
discrepancy in 1978 at the time she purchased her property and 
received her survey that reveals the fence is not on the deed 
boundary. Also, prior to this suit defendant failed to file suit 
in 1989 after her attorney telephoned such intent to an attorney 
the plaintiffs had consulted about this matter, (letter, R. 203) 
Again, prior to this suit defendant failed to file suit in 1989 
after the plaintiffs and two other adjacent landowners rejected 
her proposed boundary agreement making the fence lines the 
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boundaries, (boundary agreements, R. 115-117) Also in 1989, 
prior to this suit the defendant threatened to sue the plaintiffs 
for "serious damages" if they installed a fence along the common 
deed boundary, (letter, R. 204B) 
CONCLUSION 
In the current case plaintiffs have cited prima facie 
evidence to show there was not mutual acquiescence in the fence 
as the common deed boundary. They have cited a case in point and 
other authority to show that boundary by acquiescence is 
inappropriate in light of the evidence. 
THEREFORE, plaintiffs ask the Utah Supreme Court: 
(1) to reverse the lower court's ruling of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
(2) to grant plaintiffs quiet title to the disputed 
property: 
(3) to award the plaintiffs compensation for defendant's 
use of their property from February 21, 1978, the date of the 
defendant's survey; 
(4) to award plaintiffs their legal costs; and 
(5) to initiate disciplinary action against attorneys for 
the respondent for violating rules of professional conduct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Martin L Hocking, PlaintfJ/f an< id Appellant, pro se 
rudith C. locking, Pvaintiff and Appellant, pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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by ' Green indicates that . - >arlier fence ^rarated tru* property 
at, the same spot a- the • .* 'nstaiiec iv ,-reen - * ml- a~ 
defendants as a matter <• . -: ire eat. tied *o th* iana separated 
b} r the fenced boundary :<ituer titles -t-cord 
according to the acrr.miv, :-J*. doctrine oi oouraiary by acquiescence. 
The plaintiffs • v.-ct: . : * hurt's summar\ 
facts or law. r] *,ai - M maintain - nat earlier surveys that 
they (1969) and 1 a - defendant { i< 8) had ordered somehow 
indicate that there was a nut.ua. acquiescence. However, 
plaintiffs provide v--.» *. n • a, surveys raise- • i-
boundary issue whea dr-.v 19b^ tna * -a-
plaintiffs realise rence line effe J : ,„ - more th^r 
years was off tr __ aeea. ^iaintxffs simply have i^ ^ ^ . u 
- _*r . :...,: .. jmise 
juagmen* Accordi..,^ , ^umr.\jr, judgment " * 
defendant .uems required according tc , tah _, *« 
:\r plaintiffs' motion seeking reimbursement 
paralegals tees is dt-nied, . f * at plaintiffs fee. 
-ause of action against tj. •-• - **-*- — r v i ^ •»/.*";. 
r:i^ an ac: a on agai ns t him 
r
"«- defendant?" I M C . «• , i >_-; 
] i}: : >i Mils ruling. 
Dated ::*:-ntembw », 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is * < • • f»r t • ' u. .* 
Judged—7^ 
Mdersianed mailed a true and 
Martin L. Hocking 
Judith C. Hocking 
34 9 East Center Street 
Centerv i 11 e, IJT 8 4 014 
Michael T. Roberts 
First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
SLC, UT 84101-16 05 
Dated this P^pS^l day of September 1991, 
tdL dc&frj 
v " riterk 
Exhibit C 
MARTIN L H0CK I NGn an d 
JUDITH C. HOCKING, pro se 
349 E^st Center Street 
P„l3« box 4/6 
GenterviI 1e, Utah 84014 
T ele p h o n e;; (8 01) 292 1B 8 z 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
D AVI S C 0 U N T Y, S 7 A T" E 0 F:: U T A H 
MARTIN L. 
JUDITH C. 
vs. 
HOCKING, and 
HOCKINS, 
P l a i n t i f f s , , 
M E R L Y N T I N G E Y R 0 B E R T S« n / k / a 
M E R L Y N T I N G E Y d e I a M E L E N A 
D e f G n c i a n t « 
P L A I N T I F F S 1 ' MOTION TO AMEND 
F I N D I N G S 9"™ 2 5 ~~ 9 1 
i._-1 v 1 J. J'MO « 
vJuaqe i / o u q i ai :?rnao^ 
j L>. 5 ™-«. J . r." 5 t «... V~ '._.< i \ «...'. .:. «:-• :..} .C. \ 5..: .-• '_.' 1 \J «... O . J J H-. t: U / J I T S m o v e m e 
Cour t t o amend t he f 1 n d i n q s by J udqe Cor nabv i n h 1 s :! Ru I i nq on Mo1 i on •: 
f or Sumn 1ar v Judqmen tJs dat ed E>eP t emfoer 25 =1 1991, t o show t he f i nci i nqs 
were c o n t r o v e r t e ci b y compete n t e v i d e n c e a n ci / o r t h e f i11 d i n g s w e r e n o1 
suppor'teci by admi. ssabI e ev:i. cience, P1 ai nt i f f s rr?ove ti"1e Court to arnend 
the f o 11 owi nq f i nci i nqs t o compor t vvi t h the ev:i. denc e pr esented i n 11"!e 
1«. Findings Milton C, Green, in 1953,, pursuant to a survey.; 
erected a chain-link fence that still serves as a boundary between 
whav. nai/4 "che n o c k 11 IQ EH \a de ia Helena .tais. 
A m e n d m e n t s I n ivl i 11 o n C» (3 r e e n :' s d a p o s:!. t i o n da te d J u n e i 1
 t! i 9 91,( 
he tes t i f i ed : , !1 Sometime it t 1953 or 1954 \ i ?e erecte--..; me ; ''.-in lit \k 
fence,, CR=. 773,, l ines 8-12, Green deposition) However, h is warranty 
deed s show he d i d n ot pur ch ase t he east h a I f of t he P1 a i n t i f f s? 1 o t 
unt i 1 1956f, t h r e e year s a r t e r he pi\.r cnase•• • v.n•• • wes t ha i f „ (R „ 760, 
761s 1953 and 1956 warranty deeds) The concrete base of the fence has 
no seam? provi ng the conerete base was poured at one t i nie „ !ii , 
Therice Duncan, Green's grantor, signed a notarized statement for the 
Plaintiffs stating he did not install the concrBtB fence base. <R« 
764,, statement 4) Theref o r e, the pr esumpt i ve evidence i s that Green 
i. n s t a 1 1 e d t h e f e n c e i n 1956 o r late r„ 
D i d (3 r e e n i n s t a 1 1 t h e f e n c e p u r s u a n t t o a s u r v e y? I n G r e e n :" s 
deposition when he was asked if he took a !!SLU vey pi i or to building 
, „ ,. t h is f e n c e 1 i n e!', h e s t a t e d , ;! Y e s!: T h e r i c e D u n c a n h a ci t o f u r n i s h 
me a sur vey for the t i 11 e comp any I". 3ec ur i t y 7 i tie Comp an y i n 
Farmington, Utah"! « ., „ „ Bi 1 I 1 i\ sgey Lai id I 2 — looked it ovor\ and 
the survey 1 i ne was withi n reasonab 1 e di stance of the o 1 ci f ence there, 
you know, a foot or two or whatever., 1 can- t rom&mh&r exactly," CR« 
773—775,, Green deposition) Also, he testified this same survey was 
used by Security Title Company to issue title insurance; to his grantee 
it\ 1963. (R. 779-780;, Green deposition) For Green T- .-
 ]e 
installed the fence pursuant to a survey, contradicts his next 
statement that he a n d T i n g e y
 f! the a d j a c e n t la n d o w n e r , n o t e d p 
difference between the fence line and the survey line, H I so,, ur e^n 
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states he neecied the survey f or t i 1.1 e i nsiJrance „ anci yet h i s 1 953 
IA!ar-r"ant y deed shows i ts r ec:ord i nq was requested by Green i n 1959, si. x 
year s arter he purehased the f i r st ha1 -f of t he P1 ai nt i f f s:" pr oper ty „ 
(Rw 760, 1953 warranty deed) Security Title Company has no rBCorti of 
6 r e e n :' s 195 3 o r 19 5 6 n u r c: h a s e s o f t h e P1 a i n t i f f s ? p r o p e r t y , w h i c h i s 
c o n f i r' m e d fa y t h e r e c o r d :i. n q :1. n t o r ro a t :l. o n o n I:? o t h o t h i s d e e d s« S e c: u r i t y 
T i t l e C o m p a n y d o e s h a v e a r e c o r d ni r> ^r-~-: ••"'-- -.v? < Security 
Ti 11 e Company:' s f :l. 1 e o f the 1963 transac:t i on shows a s*„irvey was not 
needed, and theref ore the t i1e contains no survey« The def ense has 
n o t fa e e n a fa 1 e a r ^ i 1 1 i n q t o p r• a d u c e (3 r e e n :< s s u r v e y e v e n t !"i o u. q h t ri e 
P1 a i n t i. f f• s r e q u e s t ed i t i. n their H Request f or F::r c3ciuc t i. on o f Docu.{*nen ts!! 
dated s.nd served August 14 M 1991= <Ra 896-897, item 2) Green's 
p redecessor i. n i nterest gave the }:) 1 ai nt i. f f s a notarized st atement that 
he did not give Green a survey because he could not get one due to 
unplatted east—west property. (R. 763 ? statements 2^ 3) The defense 
B.nd Green ask the Court to believe that iti 1953, a surveyor 
e r r o n e o u CB 1 v 1 a c: a t e d a fa o u n d s.ry d esc r i fa e d i n G r een ? *=*> w a r r a n t y d e e ci a s 
fa e i n g 100 f e e t scJUt ii f r om t h e f r ont c:)f T i. n q ey ' ' .i.....T. ; 
t h a t t h e s u r v e y o r made a twelve ••- f o o t e r r o r ,= T h e r e i s c o n 11 :l. c ting 
testimony*, in addition to documented anci presumptive evidence this 
s u rvey d oe s n ot e x i s t « 
2„ l::: i nd i ng; Wi 1 1 i am Ti ngey owned de 1 a He 1 ena:! s pr oper t y t rofi! 
1947 to 1978. 
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Amendments William Tinqey owned de Is. Helena's property -from 
1947 to 1971, In 1971 Tingey transferred the defendant ' s propertv and 
twelve other properties to a family owned corporations Tinqey Real 
Estate, Incorporated„ <R. 86-90, 1971 warranty dBBd) Therefore, 
there could not be a twenty-year period of acquiescence in the fence 
line by the defendant's predecessors in interest, because there was 
not a. twenty-year period of ownership by Tinqey after the fence was 
installed in 1956 or later„ Tinqey testified he used the defendant's 
property and the adjoining strip of the plaintiffs" property to 
cu.1 tivate a commerc i a 1 row crop f rom the t i me he purchased thi s 
property i. n 1947 unt i 1 Tinqey Rea 1 Estate,, Inc « tr ansf erred title to 
the defendant in 197EL but Tinqey did not own this property from 1971 
through 197S- <R„ 91, 1978 warranty deed) A corporation is a 
separ ate legal ent i t y „ The transf er to and f rom the corporation i s 
via. recorded warr• anty deeds„ 
3B Findings Milton C, Green and William Tingey agreed that the 
f ence wouI d <:::onst i tute a boundary between thei r proper1y» 
Amendments Green's statement that he and Tinqey discussed the 
placement of the fence line and agreed that it would constitute the 
boundary between their lots., is controverted by Tingey" s deposition,: 
Tingey is the defendant's father. In his deposition dated December 
14P 19905 when he was asked if he had any idea of where the fence was 
placed in relationship to his boundary, he said, "I did not. 1 was 
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never asked to participate with the fence, financially or any other 
way, I never was," (R. 1299 lines 6-9, Tingey deposition) 
4. Findings An affidavit by Green indicates that an 
earlier fence separated the property at the same spot as the one 
i nst a 11 ed by (3reen :i. n 1953 „ 
Amendment; The existence of an old fence was contradicted by the 
deposition of William W« Tingey, the defendant's father, and by a 
notarized statement by Therice Duncan* Greerr s grantor. (R* 129-130, 
Tingey deposition;; R„ 763,, statement 15 Duncan statements) Also, 
T i n q e y t e s t :i. f i e d t h a t b e f o r e h e p u r c: h a s e d h i s lot i n 19 4 7, t h e w h o 1 e 
east half of the block was owned by Evans. (R. 129,, lines 12-13, 
Ti ngey depos 11 i on ) T"he warranty deeds show that wi 11 i am Evans 
pur chased the east ha1f of t he b1ock i n 1932 from a common grantor„ 
So even if there was an "old fence",, it would have been considered a 
harrier, not a boundary,: prior to Tingey" s 1947 purchase,, Tingey" s 
1947 warranty deed does not reference an old fence line as the 
boundary., <R„ 85,, 1947 warranty deed) Conclusive evidence the !iold 
fence" could not have been considered a boundary is in Greerrs 
deposition- He states that he and Tingey looked over the fence and 
n o t e d t h at it w a s n o t o n h :i. s s u rvey I i n e« (R „ 773-775, G r e e n 
d e p o s i. t i o n ) A n o r a 1 agreement i. s n o t b i n d i n g i f i t i s k n o w n t hat t h e 
f ence i s not on the survey Iine* A1so, Green noted that the "old 
fence" was in disrepair, another factor which shows it could not have 
bee n c o n s i d e r e ci a h o u ndary „ 
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5. Finding: It was not until 1989 that the Plaintiffs realized 
a fence line in effect for more than 30 years was off by 12 feet« 
Amendment" Plaintiffs stated that at the time they purchased 
t he i r propert y i n 1969 , t he y con su11 ed with t wo r ea1 estate 
p I- o f e s s i o n a 1 s a b o u t t h e d i s p u t e d p r o perty a !i d were qive n e r r o n e o u s 
advice that comports with Judge Cornaby's ruling« Plaintiffs also 
stated they obtained a plat from the Davis County Recorder's Office at 
that time, which they presented as s.n exhibit. (R. 737-738, items 1, 
2? R„ 836-840, supporting exhibits) Judge Cornaby rejects these 
s t a t e m e n t s.,- b u t a c c e p t s s t a t e m e n t s b y !vl i 11 o n C« Green that a r e 
c:ont rover ted by test i mony
 ? document s ,, and /or presumpt i ve Bvicience« 
3 01 h d a y o f S e p t e f n b e r
 ?i 1991. 
Iv! a r t i n L. H o c k i n g
 5 P 1 a i n t i f f ,{ p r o s e 
u d i t h C u H o c k i n g
 ? P1 a i n t i f f 9 p r o s e 
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